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From the part of the Commission, the realisation of the migration package 
proposed demands new legislative, cooperative, training and organizational 
work also from the Hungarian law enforcement bodies, while the conditions of 
stable operation of high quality are partly missing.  
 
 
Major János Besenyő 
 
 
EU SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION 
IN DARFUR - AMIS 
 
 
The European Union established an EU civilian-military action to support 
the African Union's enhanced Mission to Sudan / Darfur, AMIS, at the request 
of the African Union (AU), on 18 July 2005 (Council Joint Action 
2005/557/CFSP, OJ L 188, 20.07.2005). 
 
The mandate for this supporting action by the EU came to an end on 
31 December 2007 when AMIS handed over to the African Union / United 
Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). 
 
The purpose of the EU's supporting action was to ensure effective and 
timely EU assistance to the AU's enhanced AMIS II mission. In providing this 
support, the EU upheld the principle of African ownership and backed the AU 
and it’s political, military and police efforts aimed at addressing the crisis in the 
Darfur region of Sudan. 
 
The EU supporting action comprised both a civilian and a military 
component. It made available equipment and assets, provided planning and 
technical assistance and sent out military observers. It trained African troops, 
helped with tactical and strategic transportation and provided police assistance 
and training. During the two-and-a-half year mandate, several dozen military 
and civilian personnel were deployed from the EU. In 2005 I was one of the first 
observers who arrived in Darfur to serve as a military advisor in logistic matters.  
In this time I had served as Deputy Field Support Service and I would like to 
present you the logistic matters and experiences in the mission are of Darfur. 
Everything that is written in this article is based on my personal experience, 
observation and opinion. 
  
Antecedent: 
In prehistoric times, the peoples of what is now Darfur were related to 
those of the Nile Valley (including Egypt), whose caravans probably reached the 
region by 2500 B.C.E. According to tradition, the region’s first rulers were the 
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Daju. By around 900 C.E., Christianity had spread to the area; by the thirteenth 
century, however, the region had fallen under the domination of the powerful 
Islamic empire of Kanem-Bornu to the west, and the Tunjur replaced the Daju as 
the ruling elite of the region. The sultanate of Darfur first entered the historical 
record during the seventeenth century, under Sulayman. Sulayman belonged to 
the Keira Dynasty, which claimed Arab descent and which removed the Tunjur 
from power. Except for an interval during the nineteenth century, this dynasty 
ruled Darfur until 1916. Gradually the Keira merged with the Fur, the 
agricultural people over whom they ruled. (The state’s name, Dar Fur, means 
“house of the Fur” in Arabic.) 
 
The slave trade figured prominently in both the formation and the 
expansion of the Darfur Sultanate. Parties from Darfur obtained slaves and ivory 
by either raiding or trading with the stateless societies that lay to its south and 
southwest. Not only did Darfur’s rulers export slaves to North Africa and along 
the “forty days’ road,” which crossed the desert from Darfur to Egypt, but slaves 
also served the sultan as soldiers, laborers, and bureaucrats. Sulayman’s 
successors expanded the state. In 1786 Sultan Muhammad Tayrab conquered the 
province of Kordofan from the Funj Sultanate of Sennar to the east. In 1821, 
however, Egyptian forces conquered the Funj Sultanate and wrested Kordofan 
from Darfur. Traders from Khartoum then began to compete in the slave trade 
with those in Darfur. Turkish-Egyptian forces under Rahma al-Zubayr 
conquered Darfur in 1874 and overthrew the Keira sultan. In 1885 a Sudanese 
rebellion under a religious leader called the Mahdi overthrew the Egyptian state, 
which had come under increasing British influence. In 1898 British forces 
defeated the Mahdist state and placed it under Anglo-Egyptian administration. 
Under their policy of indirect rule, the British restored the Darfur Sultanate 
under Ali Dinar Zakariyya. Ali Dinar played a significant role in an Islamic, 
anti-Western alliance that formed during World War I. The Anglo-Egyptian 
government subsequently invaded Darfur, killed Ali Dinar, ended the sultanate, 
and incorporated Darfur into Sudan. After Sudan attained independence in 1956, 
Darfur remained under Sudanese rule. Darfur was ruled by commissioners who 
neglected the basic needs of the people and merely fulfilled the interests of the 
central government. Only after the inhabitants of El-Fasher revolted against 
Khartoum in the early 1980s, were they allowed to have several regional 
governors from Darfur in brief succession. However, since the Islamists usurped 
power in Sudan in 1989, the majority of the governors appointed in Darfur have 
been of Arab origin. According to the motto “divide and rule” and constantly 
trying to weaken the spirit of unity among the Darfurians, the Khartoum 
government divided Darfur, which was originally one state, into three smaller 
states with three capitals: 
• El-Fasher for Northern Darfur (Shamal Darfur) 
• Nyala for Southern Darfur (Janub Darfur) 
• El-Geneina for Western Darfur (Gharb Darfur) 
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Source: Columbia Encyclopedia 
 
Conflict: 
Open warfare erupted in February 2003 when the two loosely allied rebel 
groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), attacked military installations.  
This was followed closely by peace agreements brokered by the United 
States to end the twenty-year-old civil war in the south of Sudan which allocated 
government positions and oil revenue to the rebels in the south. At that time 
rebels in Darfur, seeking an end to the region's chronic economic and political 
marginalization, also took up arms to protect their communities against a 
twenty-year campaign by government-backed militias recruited among groups 
of Arab extraction in Darfur and Chad. These "Janjaweed" militias have over the 
past year received government support to clear civilians from areas considered 
disloyal to the Sudanese government. Militia attacks and a scorched-earth 
government offensive has led to massive displacement, indiscriminate killings, 
looting and mass rape, all in infringement of the 1949 Geneva Convention that 
prohibits attacks on civilians.  
The war, which risks inflicting irreparable damage on a delicate ethnic 
balance of seven million people who are uniformly Muslim, is actually multiple 
intertwined conflicts. One is between government-aligned forces and rebels; a 
second entails indiscriminate attacks of the government-sponsored Janjaweed 
militia on civilians; and a third involves a struggle among Darfur communities 
themselves. Its implications go far beyond Darfur's borders. The war indirectly 
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threatens the regimes in both Sudan and Chad and has the potential to inspire 
insurgencies in other parts of the country. But this conflict instabilizes not only 
these countries but the others around as well. 
Mission: 
For this reason, after the Peace negotiations when the Parties (African 
countries, various fighting fractions-SLA, JEM, NRMD,-UN, EU, NATO and 
USA) agreed to send peacekeepers to Darfur to stop the violence, they had to act 
immediately. African Union (AU) decided to send troops as soon as possible to 
the area to secure it. Because the AU as a new organization faced with serious 
financial shortages and with some capacities (Logistic, Air Ops, IT) the EU, 
USA and NATO offered him help on these fields. 
After the Donor conference all organization decided to send observers to 
help and participate in the AU second peacekeeping mission (African Union 
Mission in Sudan-AMIS) in Africa. The donors begun to send their aid (money 
and equipments as well) to the mission area but the African troops weren’t 
prepare to handle them. Both of the shortage of military and police forces and 
the missing positions mostly in the logistic field made the situation very difficult 
on the ground. The African countries sent mostly infantry troops without 
working logistic support system (combat support units, etc). However the 
soldiers made good work as infantry units, nobody takes care about keeping the 
records or put in file the donated equipments for this reason a lot of things were 
missing or were used in a wrong way.  
There were shortages of staff officers in the Logistic and planning 
sections, which caused real problems and various problems with the provision 
(food, drinking and potable water, bed items, sanitation, communication, etc). 
The donors offered sometimes all services or facilities to AU, for example 
USA provided the all camps construction through the state own company, PAE. 
Although the PAE made a really good job, which based on the contract between 
AU and USA, from the AU/AMIS part nobody could directed and check them 
properly, because the missing logistic experience. 
In the same time the AU officials realized that they overcharged their 
troops on the ground and they didn’t have enough capacity to secure the Darfur 
area and run the mission as well. So for this reason they deceived to enlarge the 
troop numbers and expand the all mission. In the first phase the real strength of 
the troops were 138 MILOB’s (Military Observer) and 195 Rwandese and 193 
Nigerian Protection Forces (Aug 04)  
On the second phase the strength of troops supposed to be 3320 person 
but the AU and the participants couldn’t manage to fill the all position.(2774 
troops, included Civpol’s were on the field at the end of June 05.) This happened 
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in the enhancement phase as well (AMIS-IIE), where the mission expected to 
expand to 6171 military personal and 1560 civilian police( at the end of October 
05.) but they couldn’t fill the all positions and the third phase, where 12300 
personal were planned, this phase never come on board… 
The donors agreed on it and offered not only money, Air lift for the 
African troops and equipments but logistic advisors/expertise as well, which 
offers were requested and accepted by AU officials. This phase was AMIS II-E 
and begun on 1 July 05. For this time the EU logistic expertise begun to deploy 
to Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El-Fasher as well.   
With and wide scale agreement between AU and the donors there were 
constructed various new position inside the AU and the mission to encourage the 
growth of the logistic capacity in AMIS. The highest organization inside AU 
who coordinated the mission in Darfur, the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) 
was, where was located the ACMC section where the EU, NATO and USA 
advisors worked. Generally the ACMC is the J4 and J8 function within the 
DITF, working directly to the Chief of Staff.   
The ACMC is responsible for coordinating all logistic support between 
the AU, the Donor and Partner nations and Contractors in order to provide 
support to the operational commanders. It provides logistic synchronization 
support to the movement plan, the force generation plan, the infrastructure 
development plan and the equipment delivery programme working in co-
ordination with the Logistic Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the JLOC in 
El Fasher.   
The ACMC co-ordinates and prioritises the overall sustainment effort for 
AMIS tasking the JLOC through the chain of command as required. 
Because Darfur is only a part of Sudan it was important to establish an 
Headquarter in Khartoum to deal with the Sudanese authorities and represent the 
AU in all matters which are related with AMIS. In Khartoum we had a logistic 
cell as well.  
Generally this section acted as the logistic transit hub in co-ordination 
with ACMC and the JLOC.  Provided diplomatic clearances (Visas and Customs 
clearance), as required, and provided movement and contractual support to 
AMIS. 
In El-Fasher (the capital of Darfur) deployed the Joint Logistic Operation 
Centre (JLOC), which is organized and directed the logistic system in the 
mission area and made the real work on the field.  
Generally the JLOC acted as the logistic focus within the FHQ for both 
the Military and Police missions. It prepared operational logistic plans in support 
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of the operation and acted as the operational level logistic authority.  The JLOC 
ensured that the operational theatre is properly sustained.  The JLOC worked in 
direct co-ordination with the Logistic Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the 
ACMC in Addis Ababa. You can see the organization chart here: 
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The Chief JLOC was responsible for the delivery of logistic support to 
AMIS within the operational theatre.  He worked through the Deputy Head of 
Mission and operates on behalf of both the Force Commander and the CIVPOL 
Commissioner. 
Deputy Chief JLOC. 
He acted on behalf of the Chief JLOC and is the JLOC Chief of Staff, 
coordinating all operational logistic staff effort.  
 
         Source: AMIS 
2005 
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Field Support Section (FSS). 
The FSS provided the direct logistic contact with Sectors on behalf of 
Chief JLOC and worked in co-ordination with the functional cells.  The FSS was 
responsible for the delivery of up to date logistic reports and returns from 
Sectors to the Chief JLOC.  
He was responsible in the mission area (with close relation with PAE and 
its subcontractors) for the food-catering service, camp management, water 
supply, environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for 
other orders from Chief JLOC. 
 
Log Ops and Plans. 
He provided logistic planning support to the Force Commander and the 
CIVPOL Commissioner.  Provided real time logistic support to the operation 
ensuring that the military and CIVPOL are properly sustained with C Sups in 
co-ordination with PAE.  
 
Maintenance. 
He ensured that all vehicles in theatre are properly maintained and 
supported in co-ordination with Contractors.  
 
Materiel Management 
He ensured that all equipment is properly distributed and managed to 
support the needs of the operation and all equipment is properly accounted for.
  
Movement / Air Ops. 
He coordinated all in-theatre J4 movement including tactical airlift, SH, 
(when in a J4 function) and road convoys.  
 
Medical / Environmental Health 
He coordinated medical and health service support to include treatment 
and evacuation of casualties, medical logistics, preventative medicine and 
environmental health with PAE and other medical providers. This position 
wasn’t filled nor by EU or AU in this time, for this everybody from JLOC deled 
with this matters.  
 
Communications / IT 
He coordinated the distribution and maintenance of all communications 
and IT equipment in accordance with the communications plan.  
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CIVPOL 
He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the JLOC ensuring that all CIVPOL 
requirements and enhancement needs are met. This position wasn’t manned by 
EU under my service time. 
 
EU advisors-JLOC 
  
The first EU advisors arrived in the theatre on 29 June from United 
Kingdom, Spain and Hungary. We spent our first weeks in Addis Ababa because 
we didn’t get our visas in time, so we occupied ourselves in Addis to help inside 
the DITF. Thereafter we received our visas and went to Khartoum first after that 
to Darfur. When we arrived there we got temporarily accommodation only for a 
time because the camp was overcrowded. Nearly all European expertise worked 
and lived in Africa previously (Myself in Western Sahara-MINURSO) but we 
didn’t prepared ourselves so many difficulties what we find there. 
 
We needed some days to accommodate ourselves and try to begin our job. 
Unfortunately we didn’t have offices, the JLOC were existing only on paper and 
not in the real life, and we didn’t find our African counter partners, who we have 
to work together. For this reason the Force Commander decided that we have to 
work in the FHQ logistic section and take part the replacement and development 
of AMIS II-E. Despite that we weren’t under the Force Commander command 
we begun to work with the FHQ Logistic cell and met with more problems. 
However the PAE and their subcontractor worked hard to construct new camps 
and enlarge the previous facilities they were late because the rainy season (In 
this time the only way to transport materials was with helicopters). 
 
We had to support the troops on the ground and organize the Airlift in 
close cooperation with AU, EU, NATO and USA and provide accommodations, 
food, water and others for the newcomers. The next chart show the AMIS II-E 
deployment schedule: 
 
Battalions Deployment 
Dates 
Number 
of Pax 
Estimated 
Freight 
(Tons) 
Est 
Ammo 
(Tons) 
Preferred 
APOE 
Preferred 
APOD 
Airlift 
Donor 
Nation 
Nigerian Bn 
1 
Sector 2 
1 – 14 Jul 680 40 18 Kaduna Nyala GER 
UE 
Rwandan 
Bn 1 
Sector 1 
15 – 29 Jul 680 32 16 Kigali Nyala US 
NATO 
Rwandan 
Bn 2 
Sector 7 
30 Jul – 
9 Aug 
538 32 16 Kigali El Fasher US 
NATO 
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Battalions Deployment 
Dates 
Number 
of Pax 
Estimated 
Freight 
(Tons) 
Est 
Ammo 
(Tons) 
Preferred 
APOE 
Preferred 
APOD 
Airlift 
Donor 
Nation 
Gambian 
Coy 
Force HHQ 
30 Jul – 
9 Aug 
196 12 7 Banjul* El Fasher NATO 
Nigerian Bn 
2 
Sector 8 
10 – 
18 Aug 
876 
(note 3) 
40 18 Abuja* Nyala UK 
NATO 
Senegalese 
Bn 
Sector 5 
20 – 
29 Aug 
538 32 16 Dakar El Fasher France 
UE 
Nigerian Bn 
3 
Sector 3 
1 – 
9 Sep 
484 
(note 3) 
40 18 Abuja* El Fasher UK 
NATO 
Rwandan 
Bn 3 
Sector 4 
30 Sept – 
6 Oct 
538 40 18 Kigali El Fasher NATO 
South 
African Bn 
Sector 6 
22 – 
25 Oct 
550 
(Note 4) 
32 16 Bloemfontein 
or 
Pretoria 
El Fasher Netherlands 
NATO 
South 
African Eng 
Coy, EOD 
team 
Reserve 
Coy 
28 – 
29 Sep 
210 12 (Note 2) Bloemfontein 
or 
Pretoria 
El Fasher Netherlands 
NATO 
Kenyan MP 
Sector 1 
30 Sep 25 2 - Nairobi El Fasher NATO 
 
Source: AMIS 2005 
 
Of course this schedule changed because of the circumstances (weather, 
readiness of camps, etc) and only in October we could finish the enlargement of 
AMIS. 
 
Under this time the all JLOC positions (except the CivPol and the 
Medical Environmental Health) were filled by the donor countries (Spain, 
France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Dania, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, USA and 
CA) but the AU only filled the logistic positions in JLOC at the end of October, 
till this time we worked alone with all responsibility. When we received our 
partners it was clear that expect some they don’t have any logistic background 
(graduation in logistic school or experience on the field), this made our job more 
difficult. 
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The other problem was that no any African unit (except the South 
Africans) arrived with full capacity units, because in the battalions only on paper 
worked Combat Support Units (Sector Support Cell). These units filled with 
infantry soldiers and not with logistics. The lack of logistic skill, everybody 
expected everything from the civilian contractor (PAE). However there is a new 
trend in peacekeeping or other operations that civilian companies make a lot of 
job, for what the army don’t want waste soldiers or they don’t have the 
necessary qualification for it (Logistic, Air Ops, IT, Communication, cleaning 
and construction jobs), the military component has to plan the mission needs, 
order the service and properly check the contractors before the payment. For this 
reason very important that the J4 (logistic) section will be manned with qualified 
and capable officers, who can deal with the civilian companies in all matters and 
level. In Darfur this isn’t worked properly and the mission leaders didn’t know 
really what was in the contracts, for this reason they expected sometimes more 
service from the contractor, what AU and USA government agreed on 
previously. One of our first jobs was to read trough the contracts to finalize what 
the civilian companies have to do and what is our (AMIS) right and obligation 
and create a working system together with sectors and the civilian companies 
(reports, registrations, etc). After that all of us begun to work on his job, because 
I was responsible for the Field Support Service, this mean for the food-catering 
service, camp management, water supply, environmental, health and camp 
sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC. The mission 
area was the same size as France and in the 8 sectors 33 camps were located.  
 
What made our job more difficult that in this time (from June till the end 
of 2005) the security situation was relatively calm but unpredictable, the 
banditry attacks, stealing of livestock, harassment of the civil populace by armed 
militias were usual nearly on every weeks.  
 
The fighting’s renewed in the general areas (Jebel Marra, Amu valley, 
Muhjeria, etc.) between Sudanese Armed Forces, Janjaweed militias and SLA 
and JEM. The armed Arab militias attacked villages (Tawila, Mukjar, etc) and 
IDP’s camps as well. The rebels attacked GOS and Humanitarian convoys as 
well and there were some clashes between SLA and JEM. Violent threats 
against AMIS, UN and NGO (Non Governmental Organizations) have increased 
so the situation begun to be more problematic. I think sometimes the fighting 
fractions agreed that AMIS could be a target. It happened that between Khor 
Abechi and Menawashi an unknown fighting fraction attacked to PAE trucks, 
where they killed the civilian drivers and not so later other 5 Nigerian soldiers, 
who arrive to relive the convoy. In another case other group attacked a patrol in 
Sector 5, where they took over all the equipments from the soldiers and released 
them without combat boots, so they had to walk back to the camp on bare foot. 
A lot of times they shouted for AMIS helicopters (on 24 December 05 one fall 
down and everybody on the board died) convoys and camps. But the Sudanese 
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Army wasn’t much better because they painted their attack helicopters and 
military vehicles for white and attacked the SLA and JEM positions with them. 
Of course after a time the fighters didn’t take any difference between GOS or 
AMIS white cars. Time to time the Sudanese Army organized us quite nice 
military parade around the FHQ, which were frustrated our soldiers. When we 
received the first Canadian APC’s (Armoured Personal Vehicle) the Sudanese 
authorities send us an official warning letter that they won’t tolerate if any of 
them going in the hand of SLA or JEM. After this letter they organized a tour 
with soldiers, tanks and various military equipment (from the 1960’s till today, 
mostly Russian equipments). The soldiers were yelling, crying and shouting 
with weapons around the camp, I think they try to show us who has the real 
power in Sudan. Under my time I could observe two of this kind of parade in El-
Fasher. 
 
The Humanitarian situation in the IDP’s camps were becoming over 
congested, the facilities at the camps were overstretched. However the 
Humanitarian Agencies had continued to provide life-saving Humanitarian 
assistance to IDP’s as well residents in the villages but some of them evacuated 
their aid workers because the banditries and attacks against the Humanitarian 
convoys and workers. 
 
Although the situation was unpredictable the presence of Humanitarian 
agencies, AMIS Milob’s, CivPol’s and foreign observers helped in stemming the 
tide of hostilities. 
 
In this situation AMIS/CFC (Cease Fire Committee) had continued to 
intensify its activities to reduce the incidence of ceasefire violations in Darfur. 
In accordance with its mandate as contained in article 4 of HCFA (8 April 2004 
AMIS) continuously investigated allegations in response to reports of ceasefire 
violations (Baraka, Graida, Kalma, etc). The regular patrols were conducted by 
Milob’s to promote confidence building and also to show AU presence on the 
ground. Unfortunately after some shouting incident against AU personals or in 
difficult situations the leaders of AMIS gave orders to delay patrols to save our 
soldiers. These situations were only temporarily time and after that we begun to 
conduct the patrols again. The mission leaders and the CFC embarked on 
consultations with all parties in the conflict and the Humanitarian Agencies and 
attended the Joint commission meeting once a month at N’djamena, Chad. This 
was the real situation in AMIS-IIE phase and at the end of October we had 3 
infantry battalion from Nigeria, 3 infantry battalion from Rwanda, 1 infantry 
battalion from Senegal, 1 infantry company from Gambia (as a reserve unit in 
FHQ), 1 Military Police Unit from Kenya and 1 infantry company, 1 engineer 
platoon and a EOD section from South Africa.  
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In the same time we had Military Observers, Civilian Police members, the 
workers of contractors (PAE-USA and Skylink-Canada) and their subcontractors 
(Amzar-Food, catering service, MSS-medical and Hygienic service, etc.) and 
other local workers (building and cleaning camps, etc) who didn’t live all in the 
camps but they used our facilities as well. This caused new challenges to our 
overloaded camps systems. 
 
The strength of AMIS was grown up quickly and when I left it was the 
next: 
Military all ranks: 5611 
CivPol: 1195 
PAE:   229 
AMZAR:   418 
Skylink:   139 
Total: 7589 
 
As the Deputy Field Support Service I had to work in close relationship 
with my African counter partner and the contractors on the next topics. 
 
Food-catering service.  
Monitoring PAE and AMZAR in the field are adhering to the contract and 
SOPs, as set out by the AU. In close cooperation with AMZAR & PAE organise 
the food delivery to the remote camps with AirOps. I was working with the PAE 
Food & Facilities Manager any problems regarding with the AU. I gave advice 
AMZAR in catering field, training for cooks (kitchen guideline, etc.). Our 
section had to cooperate with other sections (Ops and Plans, Logistics, Mess 
committee, etc.) and we had take care of delegations, guests 
 
Camp management. 
Monitoring PAE in the field, are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set 
out by the AU. 
I had total responsibility for the smooth running of the camp catering, 
liaising with the Catering Contractor on a daily basis. All Facilities including but 
not limited to Laundry, Dining Rooms, Accommodation, Camp Maintenance & 
Equipment Security. 
 
Water supply. 
I had monitored PAE in the field, are adhering to the contract and SOPs, 
as set out by the AU. 
I worked in close cooperation with PAE water manager to provide 
drinkable and potable water to all mission area. We checked the quality of water 
time to time (with normal senses and labor as well) 
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Environmental, Health and Camp sanitation. 
I had monitored PAE and MSS in the field, are adhering to the contract 
and SOPs, as set out by the AU. We worked in close cooperation with PAE 
camp sanitation manager and MSS operational manager. Our job was the Health 
& Hygiene Management within the Camp Facilities, to include waste 
management (Fuel spillage, waste disposal, sewage) and the Stress management 
(entertainment) 
 
Fire Marshall. 
I had monitored PAE camp managers in the field, are adhering to the 
contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU. We planned and checked the Fire 
evacuation plans, and worked in close cooperation with PAE. We organized Fire 
extinguishes delivery and refresh to the remote camps with AirOps. We 
coordinated with the PAE Operational Manager any problems regarding the AU 
(cooking inside the tents, etc.). 
 
The difficulties and challenges 
 
However most of EU advisor had served in Africa previously, because the 
shortage of time we got only one day training to prepare ourselves for this 
mission in Brussels. I think later in other operation need to organize a course at 
least 2-3 days to know each other better and make more detailed preparations. 
 
AU wasn’t prepared to handle the EU-NATO-USA advisors in a right 
way (“white face problem”). We faced with a lot of uncomfortable situation 
when African officers told us that we are colonialist or the spy of western 
countries. It happened that an African politician questioned the contents of our 
reports from Darfur. He told that our report didn’t reflect the real and true 
situation on the field and he sent us emails, in which he stated our limited 
capacity to help AU mission in Sudan. As a Hungarian it caused me very bad 
time because we never-ever had any colony in Africa and we don’t have any 
economic or other interest in this place. We arrived to help and left behind us 
our families, job and everything and risked our life and personal safety. No any 
of us from the JLOC received salary or any goods from AU, we were paid by 
EU and our own countries. Fortunately this wasn’t too usual situation because 
most of our colleagues were helpful and from the AU officials we got all support 
what we needed. However, we learned that the Africans are very sensitive and to 
give them advice and help sometimes difficult. 
 
We had quite basic environment, no EU standard (camp sanitation, 
personal hygiene, accommodation, food, etc.) As I mentioned previously when 
we arrived to Darfur, it was the enhancement time and most of the camps were 
overcrowded, that caused problems. 
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We met with different cultural conventions, different nationals. Religious 
practice and possible oversensitive (to work in Muslim environment as a 
Christian) caused us problems as well. 
 
The different approach about responsibilities and rights in the Mission 
(rank, position, qualification, etc.) gave us headache all the time.  
 
Problems which we are faced: 
 
- To live/work in a unknown environment. Not only for us but some 
African officers and soldiers were unknown this place and we had to learn to 
respect and understand the locals and cooperate with them. 
- No JOC only JLOC was worked in the mission. When the JLOC was 
created we saw that there is some misunderstanding between the military and 
civilian components and this caused unnecessary difficulties in the everyday 
life. The JLOC begun to harmonize between the components to clarify their 
logistic needs and give them advice and help to fulfill their tasks. We faced 
another problems as well, which we couldn’t solved alone so for this reason we 
suggested to create JOC (Joint Operation Centre) to harmonize the work of all 
part of AMIS (CFC, military, police and civilian parts). I don’t know why but 
some high ranking officers rejected this idea and in 2005 this section/group was 
only in our dreams. 
- No real responsibility (missing positions as well camp commandants, 
logistic, hygiene and fire officers). As I mentioned before we needed to take 
more responsibility in the work with civilian companies/contractors. For 
example, I suggested that we have to appoint in each camp logistic officers, 
camp commandants (a kind of quartermaster, who is dealing with the camp 
order and organize everything that is related with the camp), hygiene and fire 
officers, who had to work in close relationship with PAE camp managers (their 
responsibilities were to run the camps) and with the MSS doctors. No any 
soldiers like if a civilian try to give them orders (how they have to clean their 
tents, behave in the camps etc.) for this reason it was important that the Army 
part of this mission, not to be only a customer who order services from the 
civilians but a participant who take his own responsibility to run the mission. 
When I left only in El-Fasher we had an appointed camp commander and his 
work proved that when the military and police forces took more responsibility 
and worked with the contractors, everything went more smoothly than before. 
- Slow decision making. Because of lack of information, problems with 
communications and other short falls made difficult to decide on time and act 
rapidly as necessary in a military operation. 
- No any daily logistic sitreps from sectors to FHQ. Some camps didn’t 
have radios, laptops or computers and if they send any reports they wrote them 
with hands. Most of camps didn’t send any daily logistic reports as we did in 
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UN or NATO missions for this reason we didn’t get correct information from 
their needs. The sector logistic officers (who were mostly infantry, artillery or 
other specialties) without this information could report only their request to us. 
For this reason they got more logistical help than the camps. When we arrived in 
any camps the problems came out immediately (we don’t have cars, spare tires, 
communication equipment, cameras, computers, no enough food, etc) and we 
were surprised because nobody reported their real situation. If we want to run 
smoothly a military or peacekeeping operation very important to receive real 
information from the field and act immediately to fulfill the logistic needs. 
- No proper planning. It means logistically not as an operational way. 
For example it caused a lot of problem when AU officials planned their fuel 
needs (helicopters, cars, etc) because they planned for 12 days but the amount 
fuel that they calculated was enough only for 8 days. So AU could save 
approximately 1million USD but Canada (who donated the helicopters and the 
flight hours) had cost this more. For this reason in the rainy season we couldn’t 
send enough food to the camps to feed our soldiers. One soldiers supposed to get 
15 kg food/week (including the wrapping materials) so we needed for the all 
mission weekly 120 tons of food. When I arrived we received 35-45 % of the 
necessary amount of ingredients and when I left 76%, but we never received the 
full amount. This happened because we didn’t get enough fuel and other reasons 
as well. A lot of times the PAE used its own helicopters to supply African troops 
on the ground because the AMIS helicopters couldn’t flight the lack of kerosene. 
As I know we never paid the extra work and the used fuel, flight hours to PAE. 
This only one of the problems what we are faced because the improper planning. 
- Lack of Human resources or using them in a wrong way, in a wrong 
position. For example when the positions in JLOC were filled by AU, we didn’t 
have enough African officers who graduate in Logistic school or have logistic 
experience. We requested an officer from FHQ who has 15 years experience in 
transportation field and we couldn’t get her, because she was the only who could 
make PowerPoint presentation in her section. For this reason they didn’t 
released her and we got another officer who didn’t know too much about 
transportation matters and he had to learn it. Fortunately all officers who got 
position in JLOC wanted to perform good job and this made our job easier. 
- Lack of communication between sections or components and 
rivalrization. First we didn’t have enough communication equipments and the 
donors gave not the same type systems. This is a technical thing, which we can 
solve with professional communication and IT personals and harmonize the 
systems to work. But we never had enough specialists for this job. Another 
problem was that there were clashes between the military and police 
components and the JLOC as well (rights, responsibilities, etc.).It takes extra 
time and efforts to solve these situations. 
- African officials and high ranking officers (not all!) behavior towards 
non African advisors that I mentioned previously 
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Possible future for EU in Africa. 
 
- Bringing some of our experience as advisors 
- Take part in the training and build a working training system 
(Communications, IT, Logistic and AirOps) We can expect growing ethnical 
and religious problems in Africa and more hot place but not a good idea to send 
any European troops there, only military and police advisors and trainers 
(historical reasons, sensitiveness). 
- Establish a planning process in the EU to be able providing support to 
other organizations (AU) in crisis management operations and provide short and 
long term support. It can be a long term support to have staff or liaison officers 
at AU HQ in Addis Ababa to support the AU with long term crises management 
(mostly in logistic and contract issues). 
- Take part in the rebuilding process and help to develop the local 
economy 
 
I think the EU advisors made useful job in AMIS and if we use the 
experience what we got in Sudan we can prepare ourselves to make a better job 
in the next missions in Africa (Somalia, Bissau-Guinea, etc) and develop a real 
partnership with the African countries to solve the problems of the continent. 
 
